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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 
TARGETED KILLINGS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Jeff Gruenewald 
Indiana University—Purdue University, Indianapolis 
The counterterrorism policy of eliminating global jihadist movement leaders 
through targeted killings has increased dramatically over the last decade (New 
America Foundation, 2016). With targeted killings in Pakistan peaking around 
2010, just prior to the 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, unmanned aerial vehicle 
(drone) strikes continue in countries like Yemen and Somalia. Now a main feature 
of the twenty-first century war on terrorism, high-profile targeted strikes receive 
substantial media attention, symbolizing the U.S. commitment to punishing 
terrorists and preventing future attacks. As a policy, pursuing terrorist leaders 
aims to disrupt and decapitate group operations, decrease capabilities, and 
preempt planned attacks, an ostensibly sensible alternative to more intrusive 
counterterrorism strategies. Although the results of a recent poll indicate that most 
Americans are supportive of drone strikes (Pew Research Center, 2015), targeted 
killings remain controversial throughout the international community. Human 
rights groups and government watchdog organizations continue to challenge the 
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policy, which is viewed as threatening to due process, a violation of international 
law, and resulting in the deaths of innocent civilians.  
The use of targeted killings as a counterterrorism strategy has thus far 
greatly outpaced research on policy outcomes. Consequently, empirical evidence 
regarding the efficacy of targeted killings remains thin, leaving open important 
questions about if and to what extent high-profile targeted killings of terrorist 
leaders decrease global jihadist terrorism. Indeed, not enough is yet known about 
whether targeted killings deter would-be terrorists from committing terrorist acts 
or, contrastingly, if strikes that are viewed as unfair and indiscriminate result in a 
backlash of increased terrorism. Evidence from the relevant literature is currently 
inconclusive, with the aim of most prior studies centering on the legal and moral 
components of targeted killings, often in the context of the enduring Israeli–
Palestine conflict. The results of some prior studies have revealed that targeted 
killings have no effect on insurgency violence in Palestine (Hafez and Hatfield, 
2006), whereas others have uncovered deterrent effects after killings of terrorist 
leaders (Johnston, 2012; Price, 2012), and specifically those targeting the Taliban 
in Afghanistan (Wilner, 2010) and al-Qaeda operatives (Hepworth, 2014).  
In her article, Jennifer Varriale Carson (2017, this issue) examines how 
global jihadist terrorism is affected by targeted killings of movement leaders. 
Approaching the topic from a rational choice perspective, she hypothesizes that 
high-profile targeted killings will lead to significant changes in the volume of 
terrorist attacks and in the length of time until the next attack. Carson also 
explores heterogeneity in the effects of targeted killings, allowing for nuanced 
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findings that may be dependent on the types of subsequent attacks (e.g., suicide 
and lethal attacks), specific terrorist groups involved, categories of targets, and 
where strike and subsequent attacks occur. Data on more than 9,000 terrorist 
jihadist group attacks occurring between 1994 and 2013 come from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), an open-source database that includes information on 
terrorist events from around the world since 1970 (LaFree and Dugan, 2012). 
Interrupted time-series and series hazard models are used by Carson to examine 
the effects of 10 high-profile targeted killings on the average monthly number of 
attacks and number of days until the next attack, respectively.  
One of Carson’s (2017) most important findings is that none of the high-
profile targeted killings significantly affect the overall frequency of global jihadist 
terrorism, generally having neither a strong deterrent nor a backlash effect. This 
finding among others leads the author to conclude that the U.S. targeted killing 
policy has negligible effects on countering jihadist terrorism. In considering the 
indeterminacy of effects, along with the questionable morality of the strikes, 
Joseph Young (2017, this issue) writes in his policy essay that the high-profile 
targeted killing policy should be avoided. Brian Forst (2017, this issue) hesitates 
to draw such strong conclusions. In his policy essay, he suggests that other more 
nuanced effects on terrorists’ abilities to inflict future harm remain unexplored 
and may be challenging to discern because of “noise” in GTD data. Forst also 
suggests that weaknesses in available data may be in part responsible for why 
Carson fails to uncover significant increases or decreases in terrorism after 
targeted killings involving civilian casualties. This concern is not necessarily 
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shared by Joseph Young, who suggests that the GTD is a “solid” source of data 
for advancing the study of counterterrorism.  
In addition to more general findings, Carson (2017) uncovers several 
effects that are contingent on the nature of high-profile targeted killings and 
subsequent jihadist terrorist attacks. For instance, some of the 10 targeted killings 
produced deterrent effects for highly lethal attacks, suicide attacks, and attacks 
specifically perpetrated by al-Qaeda. In contrast, other targeted killings of military 
leaders led to significant increases in suicide terrorism, with location-specific 
effects identified for Yemen after targeted killings in that country. In considering 
these nuanced findings, Young (2017) muses that more detailed analyses and 
deeper theorizing are needed for understanding exactly who might be affected by 
targeted killings, in addition to how they might be affected. Young and Forst 
(2017) similarly suggest that more attention should be placed on the moral 
dimensions of targeted killings, emphasizing the need to consider how the 
efficacy and morality of the policy intersect.  
In the end, Carson (2017) contributes to the evidence-based policy 
literature on what works in counterterrorism by empirically examining the 
efficacy of high-profile targeted killings for reducing global jihadist terrorism. 
Findings from this study make it clear that the effects of targeted killings are 
contingent on the nature of the strikes and on the types of terrorist attacks 
examined.  
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